

“The default response strategy of governments [during the crisis of 2008–09] was to pursue a severely limited expansionary budget. This reduced the danger of electoral punishment due to perceived passivity in macroeconomic policy during periods of crisis, as the government was able to signal to voters that it was actively addressing the economic problems. At the same time, this strategy reduced the dangers associated with huge increases in future debts, since spending increases were very limited.”

KLAUS ARMINGEON, page 543

“Membership of public service networks is often a political responsibility rather than a voluntary act. This profoundly affects the potential for reciprocity norms to emerge. Because members may be more concerned with their extra-network reputation on the broader political stage rather than their intra-network reputation with fellow network members, they become more likely to utilize blame avoidance strategies when things go wrong.”

DONALD MOYNIHAN, page 567

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Commentary

The Shifting Global Order: A Dangerous Transition or an Era of Opportunity?

LAN XUE*

A few months ago, the *New York Times* published a column by two distinguished commentators, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon, with the eye-catching title “Rise of the Different.” Bremmer and Gordon argue that it is important to distinguish between the “rise of the rest” from 1945 to 1990 and the recent “rise of the different.” The countries denoted as the “rest” emerged under the tutelage of the United States and to a great extent, modeled themselves after the United States economically and politically. Bremmer and Gordon argue that the “different” states—including China, India, and Russia—are in another category. Relatively poor, more politically varied and unstable, they refuse to accept the legitimacy of the U.S.-led international system. They also have less experience in leadership within that system. For all of these reasons, Bremmer and Gordon predict that the “rise of the different” will “shake the global system in unpredictable, uncontrollable, and quite possibly detrimental ways.”

We should not accept this pessimistic view too quickly. In fact, there is much evidence that the so-called “different” states can play a constructive role in world affairs. Whether this potential is realized will depend heavily on the attitude of the United States and its traditional allies.

Indeed, it may be unfair to label these rising nations as “different.” The advance of these “different” countries has been the result of their embracing the general principles and institutions of the current international system. All have adopted market economic principles, opened up their economies to the outside world, and joined the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization, the key institutions of the Bretton Woods system, and important symbols of the U.S.-led international order after the Second World

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War. Because of differences in historical and cultural backgrounds, the political systems in these countries are inherently more diverse than those of their Western counterparts. Nonetheless, they all embrace democratic principles and rule of law, and are making solid progress in reforming their governance systems. These efforts have enabled them to succeed economically and become part of the rising group of “different” nations.

To claim that the “different” do not accept the legitimacy of the current global system is definitely unfair. However, the rising powers have indeed begun to question the adequacy of this system in addressing some of the daunting global challenges we are facing today. The world now confronts many challenges that were nonexistent 60 years ago. These problems include climate change, the threat of pandemics, extreme poverty, the rise of global terrorism, and the increasing complexities of global financial system. The list can go on and on. It has become painfully clear that there is a huge global governance deficit in our current international system in addressing these problems. Existing institutions have been terribly ineffective, and for some of these problems we lack any institutional foundation at all.

The performance of the United States and its traditional allies—what Bremmer and Gordon call “the rest”—in dealing with these problems has been equally disappointing. The 2008 global financial crisis and persistent European financial troubles have revealed not only fundamental deficiencies in the global financial regulation system but also the inability of the “rest” to resolve them. On the issue of climate change, many developed countries have not fulfilled obligations contained in the Kyoto Protocol. The United States simply withdrew from the Protocol due to domestic politics. In the last two United Nations (UN) climate conferences, instead of reconfirming some of the previously agreed principles and making up for the unfinished targets, the developed countries backtracked from some of the Protocol’s basic principles and threatened to abandon the agreement altogether. In the recent UN-convened Rio+20 Conference on sustainable development, most heads of state of the G7 countries were simply missing.

By contrast, the emerging powers—what Bremmer and Gordon call the “different” states—have become increasingly active in the global forums that are aimed at addressing these problems. It is the strong economic growth of the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) countries that has helped the global economic system to avert a greater global economic recession. The BRIC countries have also become a dynamic force in the G20. While it is unclear whether G20 can evolve into an effective global governance institution, it has become a stage

for the “different” to show their potential. Recently, during the IMF’s effort to raise \$456 billion in order to save Europe from the debt crisis, the emerging countries committed over \$100 billion, including a \$43 billion contribution from China. In comparison, the United States was unable to make any contribution because of its own financial difficulties.

Emerging countries have also played constructive roles in other areas. China, India, and other emerging countries have become new players in the development assistance arena. The South–South cooperation effort has stimulated robust economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. At the Rio+20 Conference held in Brazil last June, China promised to provide \$6 billion to the planned UN Environmental Organization, as well as \$200 million in assistance for small island countries and African countries.

These and other efforts by emerging powers have clearly demonstrated that the “different” are not that different after all. Instead of making trouble for the global order, they can help rebuild the global system in constructive, equitable, and cooperative ways that will benefit all, including the United States and its traditional allies.

However, this much more hopeful scenario will not appear out of blue. It will largely depend on the attitude and actions of the established powers. If they see the “rise of the different” as a threat to their hegemony in global affairs and take efforts to contain that transition, we may indeed enter a new era of global affairs with unpredictable and uncontrollable outcomes. But if the United States and its traditional allies are willing to accept diversity, show empathy with the “growing pains” experienced by rising countries, and govern with them in a mutually respectful and cooperative way, a new global governance system that is stable and effective will still be possible. This is the future we should all strive for.

As scholars of public administration, we should celebrate the rise of the “different” as a great historical opportunity for the field of governance studies and take it as our responsibility to build bridges of understanding between the “rest” and the “different” nations. Our work should be driven by intellectual curiosity on how different governance systems work and what can be learned. We should try to avoid creating simple labels such as authoritarianism that divide countries into different groups by ideological slant. Instead, we need to work hard to contextualize the development of the “different” nations in a broader historical and cultural background. In addition, we also need to communicate better our understanding to the general public

and politicians. These efforts will not only bring tangible benefits of better global governance, but also intellectual rewards for the field of governance studies.

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Commentary

变革中的全球秩序：危机四伏的转变 还是充满机遇的时代？

薛澜*

数月前，《纽约时报》刊登了两位著名评论家伊恩·布雷默和大卫·戈登的一则专栏，触目的标题名为“差异型国家的崛起”。布雷默和戈登指出，将1945年至1990年期间“其他国家的崛起”与当今“差异型国家的崛起”区分开来，是非常重要的。“其他国家”在美国庇护下崛起，在经济、政治上很大程度都效仿追随美国。而包括中国、印度和俄罗斯在内的“差异型国家”，据布雷默和戈登的看法认为应属于另外的范畴。这些国家相对贫困，政治格局多变不稳定，拒绝承认由美国主导的国际体系之合法性。并且，这些国家在全球体系中缺乏领导经验。综上所述，布雷默和戈登预测“差异型国家的崛起”将“以难以预测和控制、并且很可能是有害的方式，撼动目前的全球治理体系”。

我们不应该轻易接受这种悲观论调。有足够的证据表明，所谓的“差异型”国家是能够在全球事务中发挥建设性作用的。这些国家能否施展潜能，则在很大程度上取决于美国及其传统盟国的态度。

事实上，将这些崛起的国家称为“差异型”也许是有失公允的。“差异型”国家的进步，是在遵守当前国际体系规则和制度的前提下取得的。这些国家均采用市场经济体制，对外开放，加入布雷顿森林体系的核心机构，包括世界银行、国际货币基金组织和世贸组织等，这些机构也是二战后由美国主导的国际体系的重要标志。由于历史文化背景的差异，这些国家的政治体系与西方国家相比更为多元化。但他们都尊崇民主和法治，并且扎实推进治理体系的改革。这些努力使他们获得经济发展的成功，成为崛起的“差异型”国家。

因此，指责“差异型”国家不承认当今全球体系的合法性，绝对是有失公正的。但另一方面，这些新兴国家的确开始质疑，目前的国际体系能否充分应对当下令人畏惧的全球性挑战。

世界正面临着六十年前不曾遇到的诸多挑战，包括气候变化、大规模传染性疾病的威胁、绝对贫困、全球恐怖主义、日亦复杂的全球金

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融系统等，不胜枚举。严酷的事实表明，目前的国际体系严重缺乏有效治理，难以应对这些问题。现有的体制严重失效，在某些治理问题上则连基本的制度体系都没有。

美国及其传统盟国——即布雷默和戈登所称的“其他国家”，在处理这些危机时的表现同样令人失望。2008年全球金融危机和如今的欧洲金融困境，不仅反映出全球金融监管体系的匮乏，同时也表明“其他国家”无力解决这些问题。对于气候变化问题，很多发达国家没有履行《京都议定书》的承诺。美国则索性由于国内政治原因而退出该协定。在过去两次联合国气候大会中，众多发达国家不仅没有再次确认先前商定的规则、完成未及目标，反而在协议的基本规则前退缩，甚至威胁要放弃整个协议。近日由联合国发起的可持续发展大会“里约+20”峰会上，7国集团的国家首脑几乎都不见踪影。

反观新兴国家——布雷默和戈登所称的“差异型”国家，在全球舞台上却日益活跃，旨在解决这些问题。金砖国家强劲的经济发展趋势，使全球经济体系免于更大规模的经济衰退。同时，金砖国家也是推动20国集团发展的动力。20国集团是否能发展成为有效的全球治理体系尚不明朗，但它已然成为“差异型国家”展示潜能的舞台。最近，国际货币基金组织募集4560亿美元用来解救欧债危机，新兴国家承诺的出资金额超过1000亿美元，其中中国提供了430亿美元。相比之下，美国由于本国财政困难，没能提供任何资助。

新兴国家在其他领域同样发挥着建设性作用。中国、印度及其他新兴国家正成为发展援助领域的新成员。南南合作激发了撒哈拉以南非洲国家经济的蓬勃发展。在今年六月份巴西举行的“里约+20”峰会上，中国承诺向联合国环境规划署捐款600万美元，同时向小岛国家和非洲国家提供2亿美元援助。

新兴国家的诸多努力已清楚表明，在全球治理问题上，差异型国家与其它国家根本就不存在那么大的差异。他们有能力通过建设性的、公平的、合作的方式协助重建全球体系，从而使得全球秩序能够惠及所有国家，也包括美国及其传统盟友。

然而，这一充满希望的前景并不会从天而降。这取决于目前全球体系中强权国家的态度与行为。如果他们将“差异型国家的崛起”，视为他们在全球事务中行使霸权的威胁，并力图遏制局势的转变，全球事务的确有可能步入无法预测和控制的时期。但如果美国及其传统盟友愿意接受差异，与经历“成长痛苦”的新兴国家换位思考，并且以互相尊重与合作的态度与其携手共同治理，那么一个稳定、有效的全球治理新体系仍是有可能出现的。这应当是我们所有人力争实现的未来。

作为公共管理研究的学者，我们应当为“差异型国家”的崛起感到高兴，这是治理研究领域的重要历史机遇，同时我们要为“其他国家”和“差异型国家”之间建立理解的桥梁，并将其视为己任。我们的探索，应致力于研究不同的治理体系如何运作，以及从中可以获得

怎样的启示。我们要避免随意贴上诸如独裁主义等的标签，防止根据不同的意识形态倾向划分国家类型。相反，我们要努力把“差异型国家”的发展，置于更为广泛的历史和文化背景中。此外，我们需要将我们的研究结果，更好地与广大公众及政治家们交流沟通。这些努力不仅会给全球治理带来有形的收益，也将会对治理研究领域本身做出重要的知识贡献。

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